The Value of Historical Analysis

Historical analysis is not a favorite pursuit of salmon managers (Lichatowich 1996), but salmon management and restoration would benefit from an occasional examination of their roots. It should be obvious that the assumptions used as the basis for salmon management need critical evaluation. The region can no longer pursue the status quo and expect to achieve salmon restoration objectives (Williams et al. 1996). However, breaking with the status quo will require a different approach based on better assumptions and a new understanding of the natural-cultural ecosystems that function in Oregon's coastal watersheds. Robert Bunting (1997) has aptly described the role of history in achieving that understanding:

That new understanding will not emerge without a thorough understanding of the region's history, for the past is never past. Unless the people of the Northwest envision a historically informed future, they face the prospect of losing the environment that has so fundamentally shaped what it has meant to be a Pacific northwesterner.

Historical analysis is also important because ecosystems and their associated management institutions are products of their histories. The geological and erosional histories of the landscape and river channels, the evolutionary history of the biota in the watershed, and the history of human economies and cultures. Those histories establish the trajectory of an ecosystem's development. They determine the system's present state and the range of possibilities for future change and development. An understanding of those trajectories is important to the development of rational management programs and restoration expectations.

In this section, several past restoration plans are reviewed. At the end of the section, a general summary of the reasons why those plans failed is presented. The analysis is not intended to be complete, but it is sufficient to illustrate the importance of history and to point out some of its salient lessons. Additional historical analysis will be needed as the OCSRI is implemented.

Report from the U.S. Fish Commissioner - 1875

The first recommendations for salmon restoration are nearly as old as the commercial fishery. With the introduction of canning technology to the Columbia River in 1866, the commercial fishery for salmon intensified. Within nine years the economic value of the new industry had grown tenfold. Businessmen and political leaders wanted to ensure the long-term success of the new industry, so they petitioned the U.S. Fish Commission for advice. In 1875, in response to a request from the Oregon Legislature, Spencer Baird, the U.S. Fish Commissioner, identified three threats to salmon industry on the Columbia River: excessive fishing, dams, and altered habitat.

It is important to note that the same basic problems have persisted for 120 years and that having knowledge of what would threaten the salmon was not enough to prevent depletion and extinction. A major reason for the failure to act effectively to neutralize those threats is found in the second part of Baird's report. Baird concluded it was better to spend $15,000 or $20,000 to make salmon so plentiful through artificial propagation that protective regulations would be unnecessary (Baird 1875). He reached this conclusion just three years after the first hatchery for Pacific salmon was opened on the Sacramento River, or less time than it takes an average chinook salmon to complete its four-year life cycle.

Ninety years later, hatcheries began making meaningful contributions to the fishery (CBFWA 1989), but by then, the region had bet the natural productivity of its rivers on the promise of artificial propagation and, as a result, a large part of that productivity had been destroyed. The false assumption that we could circumvent natural ecological processes by using hatcheries prevented managers from effectively using their knowledge about the causes of salmon depletion.

While Baird's optimism and confidence in hatcheries was premature, the initial objectives of the federal artificial propagation program were reasonable and could have led to improved salmon restoration programs in future decades.

The U.S. Fish Commission's artificial propagation program had two objectives:

1. To arrive at a thorough knowledge of the life history from beginning to end of every species of economic value, the histories of the animals, and the plants on which they feed or upon which their food is nourished, the histories of their enemies and friends, and the friends and foes of their enemies and friends, as well as the currents, temperatures, and other physical phenomena of the waters in relation to migration, reproduction and growth.

2. To apply this knowledge in such a practical manner that every form of fish shall be at least as thoroughly under control as now the salmon, the shad, the alewife, the carp and the whitefish. (Goode 1884 p. 1162)

The first objective recognized the need to understand the biology and ecology of the propagated fish throughout their life cycle and in relation to the physical and biological environment. If the first objective had been implemented, the commission would have discovered that the second objective was overly optimistic at least for the anadromous Pacific salmon.¹ Although the U.S. Fish Commission did undertake extensive studies of marine fishes on the Atlantic Coast (Allard 1978), on the west coast the first objective received little attention. For example, in 1879 Livingston Stone asked the U.S. Fish Commission to assign a trained biologist to the salmon hatchery on the Sacramento River.

A biologist could have started work on Objective 1, but the request was turned down. Had Stone's request been granted it might have established a precedent and created a different approach and direction in the hatchery program and, quite possibly, our knowledge of the salmon and their status might have been very different than they are today (Hedgpeth 1941).

The region embraced Baird's recommendation with great enthusiasm and very little critical evaluation. That pattern has persisted to the present, although some hatchery programs are now being evaluated. The following illustrates the early attitude towards artificial propagation:

There can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has studied the question, that the future prosperity of our salmon fisheries depend largely upon artificial propagation... I am convinced that not more than 10 percent of the ova spawned in the open streams are hatched, owing principally to spawn-eating fish that prey on them... while from artificial propagation 90 percent are successfully hatched. What more need be said in favor of fish culture? (Oregon State Fish and Game Protector 1896 p. 33)

International Pacific Salmon Investigation Federation - 1925

Within a few years before and after the turn of the century (1882-1915), the major salmon fisheries in Oregon, Washington and California had reached and passed their peak (Table 1). By the late 1920s, it was recognized that declining salmon abundance was a regional problem. Salmon managers decided to meet and work out solutions to their common problems. On March 16 to 17, 1925, the Washington State Fisheries Board hosted a meeting of salmon managers from the Dominion of Canada, the Province of British Columbia, the United States Government, and the states of Alaska, California, Oregon and Washington.

The purpose of the meeting was to establish a process to facilitate the exchange and coordination of information among regional research and management institutions, provide a forum for discussing mutual problems and increase the efficiency of efforts to perpetuate and restore the Pacific salmon fisheries. The executives of management institutions realized:

...that present efforts to preserve the salmon fisheries, whether through regulation of fishing, hatchery operations, or other means, are without any adequate basis of accurate knowledge of the underlying facts; and further, that the efforts to get at such facts, as conducted in the past have been scattered, unorganized, and therefore less effective than they should be. ... it was admitted by all, that efforts at conservation are merely groping in the dark. (IPSIF 1925 p. 5)

Table 1. The year that salmon harvests peaked at various locations in the Pacific Northwest (Source: Cobb 1930)

The meeting discussed major problems facing salmon managers: control of fishing beyond the three mile limit, the need for uniform statistics on the salmon fishery, and the need for comprehensive information on the biology and life history of salmon. Willis Rich told the Federation that their efforts needed to be organized and directed by a program comprised of two parts. One part focused on immediate objectives and specific short-term projects.

The short-term projects should be flexible enough to change from time to time. Rich also identified the need to define a broad program of longer-term duration that would provide a framework upon which the short-term projects could be hung. He pointed out the watershed should be the basic management unit for Pacific salmon (IPSIF 1925). The organization apparently ceased to exist after 1929.

In the mid-1970s, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act allowed the region to bring the coastal fishery under control, and fishery statistics to be routinely collected. Studies of the salmon's life history, other than the work of Rich and a few others, received little attention until recently. With the general adoption of an ecosystem perspective for salmon management, biologists are rediscovering the watershed as the basic management unit.

Oregon State Game Commission Ten Year Wildlife Program - 1931²

In 1931, the Oregon State Game Commission launched a 10-year program to put game and fish management on a solid business and scientific footing. The objective was to increase the abundance of wildlife in Oregon so it approached the saturation point. Hunting and fishing in Oregon would surpass all other states. At the end of the 10-year period, the economic benefit from sportsmen and tourists was expected to reach $100 million annually.

The program was based on 14 working policies:

1. Annually increasing hatchery production of game fish, striving for liberation
2. Annually increasing production of game birds at game farms and development of additional species.
3. More effective stocking of lands and waters on the basis of practical fact findings to determine their carrying capacity for fish and game.
4. [Increase the] supply of natural food for fish, birds and mammals in the wild state.
5. Fair allocation, on a statewide basis, of fish and game produced.
6. Scientific study of all conditions affecting wildlife to determine the basis for production and stocking fields and waters and regulation of seasons and bag limits.
7. An aggressive campaign to protect the waters of the state of fish life, including stream pollution control, construction of fish ladders, screening of irrigation and power canals, and removal of obstructions.
8. Effective administration of game refuges.
9. Improvement in predatory animal control.
10. Better game law enforcement.
11. Broad educational program on conservation and accurate information service.
12. Reorganization of game department; affixing responsibilities and reducing overhead.
13. Sound financial budget and itemized expense control.
14. Cooperation with sportsmen's groups and civic and governmental agencies on all phases of the program.

The plan's approach to fisheries relied heavily on artificial propagation and scientific study to support more efficient use of hatcheries. Three basic themes are evident in the policies. Two of those themes - simplification and control of production through hatcheries - had their roots in Spencer Baird's 1875 report. Economic efficiency was the third theme which was consistent with the Progressive's view of conservation in the early decades of the 20^th century. The 10-year plan emphasized cooperative work with local communities and claimed that 15,000 citizens were actively engaged in the plan's interpretation. The need to engage local communities in salmon restoration has been revived in the OCSRI Plan.

The distribution of the plan's $400,000 budget reveals the priorities (Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of 10-Year Plan Budget.

It is obvious that research, habitat protection, and education were much lower priorities than artificial propagation.

The Oregon State Planning Board - 1938

In 1938, Oregon Governor Charles Martin asked the Oregon State Planning Board (OSPB) to review the commercial salmon fishery and determine the need to regulate or possibly terminate the use of specific types of fishing gear. The OSPB expanded that directive and made general recommendations for salmon restoration and management in the Columbia Basin. The Planning Board recognized that salmon management was fragmented among too many state and federal agencies, and there was an immediate need for coordinated management to effectively regulate the fishery and preserve the spawning grounds.

The Board recommended that the legislatures in the states of Oregon, Washington and Idaho enact an interstate compact that would establish a joint Columbia River Fisheries Commission with ex-officio participation by the federal fisheries agencies. The new fisheries commission would regulate the total catch to achieve adequate escapement, set the seasons, prescribe the types of fishing gear, and direct the needed scientific investigations. Proposed research included the effect of pollution on salmon production; improvement in fish cultural operations, a study of the effects of heavy exploitation of the sardine and other food fishes of the salmon; and a study of the need to set aside tributaries to be preserved as salmon refuges (OSPB 1938). The major recommendation of the OSPB, the establishment of a coordinated fisheries commission, was never implemented. The recommendation for salmon refuges has recently been revived (Williams et al. 1996).

Columbia River Fisheries Interim Investigation Committee - 1943

Three years after the OSPB completed its report, the Washington State Senate recognized that the 1918 compact with the State of Oregon was not preventing depletion of the salmon. The Senate established a Columbia River Fisheries Interim Investigation Committee (CRFIIC) and instructed it to determine the status of the Columbia River fishery and make recommendations for legislation. The Washington committee was directed to work with similar committees in Idaho and Oregon. The committee concluded there were three major causes for the decline of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia Basin (CRFIIC 1943):

Overfishing
The spring run of chinook salmon was depleted compared with 1883, but the committee believed the remaining spring run was adequately protected (in 1941). The summer run was being harvested at the 90 percent rate, which was excessive. The CRFIIC felt a 15-day closed season was adequate to protect the fall chinook run. Idaho harvested salmon on their spawning grounds and some arrangement had to be made to trade a larger steelhead escapement to Idaho for protection of the spawning chinook salmon.

Habitat
The foremost problem was the loss of available spawning area above Bonneville Dam. In its survey of the basin, the CRFIIC found only one stream not heavily impacted by irrigation withdrawals and unladdered dams; that subbasin was the Salmon River in Idaho. They noted, however, that the Salmon River had habitat problems created by a dam blocking sockeye migration into Redfish Lakes and from mining pollution and irrigation in some tributaries. The major production areas for summer and fall run chinook salmon were the remaining undammed mainstem areas of the Columbia and Snake rivers.

Institutional Problems
The CRFIIC agreed with the Oregon State Planning Board that institutional fragmentation led to a lack of effective control over the fishery. Habitat protection laws were administered by four agencies and hatcheries were supervised by three agencies. The committee concluded that, "We are hopelessly defeated in obtaining any solution to the Columbia River fisheries unless we simplify our administration over the resource." (CRFIIC 1943 p. 7)

The CRFIIC and the OSPB recognized a similar problem - fragmented responsibility and authority - and made a similar recommendation, namely, the establishment of a tri-state fisheries commission with an independent staff to manage all aspects of the salmon fishery. As indicated above, this recommendation was never implemented.

Lower Columbia River Fisheries Development Program - 1946

In the mid-1940s, the fisheries agencies faced the prospects of massive development of the hydroelectric potential of the Columbia Basin. To protect the salmon fishery, they devised a plan to mitigate the impacts of the proposed development - the Lower Columbia River Fisheries Development Program (LCRFDP) (Laythe 1948).

The LCRFDP was a cooperative program including the states of Oregon and Washington and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). It had a planned life of 10 years, but it has continued for the past 45 years and it can be considered the grandfather of the current efforts to mitigate for the effects of the hydropower system [e.g., the Northwest Power Planning Council's (NPPC) Fish and Wildlife Program]. As the title suggests, the program's objective was to concentrate salmon production in the lower Columbia River below the proposed McNary Dam. At the time, biologists believed that hydroelectric development in the mid- and upper Columbia and Snake Rivers would eliminate or drastically reduce salmon production in the Columbia watershed above McNary Dam.

The LCRFDP had six parts:

1. Remove obstructions to salmon migration in tributaries to the lower Columbia River.
2. Clean up pollution in major tributaries like the Willamette River.
3. Screen water diversions to prevent the loss of juveniles in irrigation ditches, and construct fishways over impassable barriers in the tributaries of the lower Columbia River.
4. Transplant salmon stocks from above McNary Dam to the lower river.
5. Expand the hatchery program by remodeling existing hatcheries or building new facilities.
6. Create salmon refuges by setting aside most of the tributaries below McNary Dam exclusively for the maintenance of salmon and steelhead runs (Laythe 1948).

The hatchery program was one of six parts of the LCRFDP, but within a few years it was the dominant part. In the third year of the program (1951), hatcheries and habitat consumed 49 and 5 percent, respectively, of the budget (USFWS 1951). By 1986, 79 percent of the budget was expended on hatchery operation and maintenance and 10 percent on screens and habitat (Delarm et al. 1989). Although salmon sanctuary legislation passed the Washington Legislature, a similar bill was defeated in Oregon Legislature killing that part of the LCRFDP.

By the late 1930s and early 1940s, research into the salmon's life history, biology and artificial propagation was giving biologists a different perspective on salmon management and restoration. Once the home stream theory was proven, it became generally recognized that salmon species were composed of local populations adapted to the environment of their home stream (Rich 1939; Craig 1935). Biologists were becoming skeptical of hatchery effectiveness (Cobb 1930) and viewed hatcheries as an impediment to effective conservation programs (Rich 1941). In spite of these new understandings, salmon managers did not modify their tradition of relying almost exclusively on hatcheries, and artificial propagation was emphasized in the LCRFDP. Strong tradition and institutional barriers, rather than current science, shaped the LCRFDP's priorities.

Pacific Salmon Rehabilitation Conference - 1961

In 1961, Governor William Egan of Alaska convened a conference to discuss the decline of Pacific salmon throughout the Northwest, review research and management techniques, and search for ways to develop a coordinated, coastwide program [Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) 1961]. Generally, the problems identified by the conference attendees were similar to the problems identified in the earlier conferences; consistent with massive hydroelectric development, the growing problems associated with dams were emphasized. The need to investigate the genetics of salmon populations and the importance of individual populations in management were other areas of concern identified in the Governor's Conference.³

The conference differed from the Oregon State Planning Board and the Washington State Senate in an important area. The need for closer coordination was recognized as a high priority by the 1961 conference, but the participants rejected establishment of a super agency or salmon management council as a solution to institutional fragmentation. By 1961, salmon management was becoming highly politicized with the net effect that fragmentation of salmon management among institutions was becoming entrenched. To illustrate the problem, consider this observation made at the conference:

It was disquieting that there was little argument or discussion among the scientists present, as there might have been had they been free of controls. Each spoke as a representative in one way, or the other, of his organization, as though departmental 'policies' were involved in anything they might say. No antagonism or differences of opinion appeared even if present. This is not a healthy or normal state as far as scientists are concerned, because it is in diversity and originality of ideas that there exists opportunity for improvement or change, so badly needed in fisheries biology. It was most apparent that organizational controls dominated. The conference brought out clearly that conservatism, the deadly sameness of the methods and results inherent in this close organizational control. (ADFG 1961 Report of the Evaluating Committee p. 14)

Comprehensive Plan for Production and Management of Oregon's Anadromous Salmon and Trout. Part I. General Considerations and Part II Coho Salmon Plan - 1982

In 1976, ocean conditions underwent significant change (Ebbesmeyer et al. 1991), which proved to be unfavorable to survival and production of coho salmon from Oregon's coastal stream and the Columbia River (Nickelson 1986). Coho harvest declined significantly in 1977 and has remained below the 1965-1976 period of favorable ocean conditions. After several years of depressed production, Oregon developed and released a comprehensive plan for production and management of Oregon's coho salmon (ODFW 1982).

The Oregon coho plan reflects the growth in research and systematic collection of fishery statistics initiated in the 1940s. The availability of extensive databases and research information shows in the plan's extensive analysis of the factors contributing to the coho salmon's decline, description of life history, and the use of production models. A unique feature of the coho plan was its framework (Part I), which describes broad objectives, constraints and guidelines, and underlying theories and assumptions. The Oregon coho plan was one of the first to include a broad framework, but it was 56 years after Rich identified the need.

The coho plan's ten management policies (Table 3) reflect an emphasis on harvest and hatchery production (Policies 1-4 and 10) similar to the 1931 plan. However, the policies also show a definite shift into new concepts and values. Natural production was recognized as an important element in the production system (Policy 5). The importance of locally adapted stocks was recognized (Policies 8 and 9). The shift did not go as far as a recognition of the importance of an ecosystem perspective although all salmon habitats in the freshwater, estuary and ocean are considered. The plan's approach was consistent with fisheries science at the time.

Three years after the plan's adoption, ODFW published a detailed progress report. No further progress reports were issued. The plan had two major short comings: a basic assumption that ocean conditions would change causing improved coho survival and inadequate public involvement (Personal communication, Harry Wagner, Retired Chief of Fisheries, ODFW, February 16, 1997).

Table 3. Coho Salmon Management Policies (Source: ODFW 1982)

The eight plans reviewed above do not constitute a complete list of the salmon restoration plans in the Pacific Northwest. There are at least another dozen plans or programs for the Columbia River alone. In addition, Oregon has developed several basin management plans and statewide species plans. A review of those plans is beyond the scope of this preliminary study, but such a review would benefit the implementation of the OCSRI Plan.

Why Did Past Salmon Restoration Plans Fail?

Past restoration plans failed to halt the decline of salmon in Oregon's coastal streams, which means that the OCSRI Plan will have to break with tradition if it is to be successful. There is much more at stake today. Many populations in Oregon's coastal streams are on the verge of extinction. Without some tangible improvement in their condition, salmon may be lost to the present and all future generations of Oregonians. In addition, the natural resiliency that historically characterized the ecosystems and salmon populations has been greatly diminished, making a small margin of error for the OCSRI Plan.

Why did past plans fail to achieve their intended results? A first cut at a list of those reasons is given below. That list should be considered preliminary; it is not the product of exhaustive analysis, but rather a starting point for future, more definitive analyses. The list is a yardstick against which the current plan can be judged and a set of guidelines for future revisions of the plan.

Preliminary List of Shortcomings of Past Plans

Past plans considered the salmon largely independent of the ecosystem and ecological processes of the watershed, estuary and ocean. That perspective was facilitated by an emphasis on harvest and artificial propagation.

1. Past plans considered the salmon largely independent of the ecosystem and ecological processes of the watershed, estuary and ocean. That perspective was facilitated by an emphasis on harvest and artificial propagation.

2. The implementing agency generally did not report progress, problems and successes on a regular schedule. This is an indirect indication that the plan did not remain a priority within the responsible agency.

3. Institutional barriers were ignored even when they were not specifically identified. Plan development often failed to consider the structure and limitations of the organization that had to implement the plan.

4. With the exception of the 1982 Oregon Coho Plan, the restoration plans lacked explicit conceptual foundations. The implied conceptual foundations were largely based on untested assumptions from the 19^th century.

The plans lacked clear commitment and support from political leaders. Public involvement was often minimal.

References

Allard, D. C., Jr. 1978. Spencer Fullerton Baird and the U.S. Fish Commission. Arno Press, New York, NY.

Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 1961. Pacific salmon rehabilitation: Highlights and recommendations of the 1961 Governors' conference on salmon. Department of Fish and Game, Alaska.

Baird, S. 1875. Salmon fisheries of Oregon. Oregonian, March 3, 1875, Portland, OR.

Bunting, R. 1997. The Pacific Raincoast: Environment and Culture in an American Eden, 1778-1900. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.

Cobb, J. N. 1930. Pacific salmon fisheries. Bureau of Fisheries Document No. 1092, Washington, DC.

Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority. 1989. Review of the history, development, and management of anadromous fish production facilities in the Columbia River basin. Portland, OR.

Columbia River Fisheries Interim Investigating Committee. 1943. Report on the problems affecting the fisheries of the Columbia River. State of Washington, Twenty-seventh Regular Session, Olympia, WA. Record Group 48, National Archives, Washington, DC.

Craig, J. A. 1935. The effects of power and irrigation projects on the migratory fish of the Columbia River. Northwest Science 9:(1)19-22.

Delarm, M. R., E. Wold, and R. Z. Smith. 1989. Columbia River fisheries development program fishways and stream improvement projects. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS F/NWR-20, Seattle, WA.

Ebbesmeyer, C. C., D. R. Cayan, D. R. McClain, F. H. Nichols, D. H. Peterson and K.T. Redmond. 1991. 1976 step in Pacific climate: Forty environmental changes between 1968-1975 and 1977-1984. 7^th Annual Pacific Climate (PACLIM) Workshop, April, 1990, California Department of Water Resources.

Goode, G. B. 1884. The status of the U.S. Fish Commission in 1884. Part XLI in Part XII Report of the Commission, U.S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries, Washington, DC.

Hedgpeth, J. W. 1941. Livingston Stone and fish culture in California. California Fish and Game, 27:3 126-148.

International Pacific Salmon Investigation Federation (IPSIF). 1925. Transcript of proceeding of meeting of International Pacific Salmon Investigation Federation, Executive Committee. November 23, 1925, Seattle, WA.

Laythe, L. L. 1948. The fishery development program in the Lower Columbia River. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society, Sept 13-15, 1948, Atlantic City, NJ.

Lichatowich, J. A. 1996. Evaluating the performance of salmon management institutions: The importance of performance measures, temporal scales and production cycles. Proceedings of Pacific Salmon and Their Ecosystems. University of Washington Center for Streamside Studies, College of Forest Resources, College of Ocean and Fisheries Sciences, January 10-12, 1994.

Nickelson, T.E. 1986. Influences of upwelling, ocean temperature, and smolt abundance on marine survival of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) in the Oregon production area. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 43(3): 527-535.

Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. 1982. Comprehensive plan for production and management of Oregon's anadromous salmon and trout. Part I. General Considerations. Part II. Coho Salmon Plan. Portland, OR.

Oregon Fish Commission. 1962. An evaluation of the status of the Columbia River summer steelhead run. Portland, OR.

Oregon State Game Commission, Oregon Sportsmen, Governmental Agencies and Civic Organizations. 1932. (Date of report not recorded on document) Process report on completion of first year 10 year wildlife program covering Fiscal Year Oct. 1, 1931 - Sept. 30 1932.

Oregon State Planning Board. 1938. A study of commercial fishing operations on the Columbia River. Report submitted to the Governor of Oregon, Salem, OR.

Rich, W. H. 1939. Local populations and migration in relation to the conservation of Pacific salmon in the western states and Alaska. Department of Research, Fish Commission of the State of Oregon, Contribution No. 1, Salem, OR.

Rich, W. H. 1941. The present state of the Columbia River salmon resources. Department of Research, Fish Commission of the State of Oregon, Contribution No. 3 425-430, Salem, OR.

United States Fish and Wildlife Service. 1951. A program for the preservation of the fisheries of the Columbia River basin. Washington, DC. Record Group 48, National Archives, Washington, DC.

White, R. 1995. The organic machine. Hill and Wang, New York, NY.

Williams, R. N., L. D. Calvin, C. C. Coutant, M. W. Erho, Jr., J. A. Lichatowich, W. J. Liss, W. E. McConnaha, P. R. Mundy, J. A. Stanford, and R. R. Whitney. 1996. Return to the river: Restoration of salmonid fishes in the Columbia River ecosystem. Independent Scientific Group, Portland, OR.

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